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Steven C. Dahl, deceased,
Plaintiff,
OPINION

v.
The Industrial Commission of
the State of Utah, Revlon
Service, Inc. and/or Liberty
Mutual and/or Default
Indemnity Fund,

Case No. 860215-CA

Defendants.

Before Judges Davidson, Greenwood and Jackson*

FILED
APR 1 5 1987
Timothy M. Shea
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court oi Appeals

DAVIDSON, Judge:

Plaintiff wife Cynthia Dahl appeals from an Industrial
Commission denial of her Motion for Review of an Order
dismissing her claim for dependent's death benefits. We
reverse.
Plaintiff and the deceased, Steven Bradley Dahl, were
married in Colorado on October 22, 1978. Plaintiff was
employed by Frontier Airlines and the deceased was unemployed.
Several months after the marriage, the deceased took employment
with Revlon Service, Inc. and continued in that employment
until his death. During September of 1979, the couple moved to
Utah so deceased could manage Revlon's local district.
Plaintiff was able to base out of Salt Lake City and continued
with the airline. Upon arrival in Utah, the couple purchased a
home in Sandy. The financing arrangements required a monthly
mortgage payment of approximately $778.00. The deceased
suffered a heart attack in February of 1984. This appeared to
trigger a decline in the marriage relationship. As a result,
plaintiff departed the family home during November of 1984 and
returned to Colorado. Plaintiff and the deceased maintained
telephone contact and would meet when the latter had occasion
to be in Denver. During January of 1985, the deceased filed a
Complaint for divorce. In March of 1985, plaintiff's attorney

prepared a Verified Motion for Order to Show Cause seeking
temporary monthly support of $750.00. This motion was never
heard because the parties agreed that the deceased would
temporarily maintain the mortgage on the family hora&'aiid roak&>
payments on the current debt obligations of the couple.
Subsequently# both parties prepared Property Settlement and
Separation Agreements. That of the deceased was signed by
plaintiff on July 23, 1985, and by the deceased and his
attorney on July 25, 1985. In the signed Agreement both
parties waived alimony# the deceased was to make the mortgage
payments on the home and pay plaintiff for her share of the
equity therein, the parties were to equally share certain
specific debt obligations, and the various personal property
was distributed. The stipulation was filed with the District
Court after Mr. Dahl's death which he met in a commercial
aircraft accident on August 2, 1985, while returning from a
business trip. The deceased's attorney had filed a
Certification of Readiness for Trial in the District Court, but
the matter had not been heard at the time of Steven Dahl's
death.
The hearing record reveals the parties* joint income to
have been $57,624.00 in 1983 and $59,286.00 in 1984. In 1984,
plaintiff's gross income was approximately $20,000.00 which
reflects the two months she took off because of the deceased's
heart attack in February of that year. During the initial
three months following plaintiff's return to Denver, she sent
the deceased $200.00 per month to assist in the expenses of the
home and the joint debt obligations. These payments were
discontinued when the deceased filed for divorce. At the time
the deceased agreed to assume the joint debt obligations, these
amounted to approximately $7,000.00, exclusive of the mortgage.
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-73 (1986) requires death benefits to
be paid to one or more dependents of the decedent. Section
35-1-71(2) (1986) contains the presumption that a surviving
spouse living with the decedent at the time of death is wholly
dependent on the decedent. However, the same subsection
states, "[i]n all other cases, the question of dependency,, in
whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the
facts in each particular case existing at the time of the
injury or death of such employee....H Utah case law limits
dependency to fact situations wherein the deceased has provided
financial assistance or comparable assistance in the support of
a dependent. Farnsworth v. Industrial Commission, 534 P.2d
897, 898-899 (Utah 1975).
The concept of dependency was explained by the Utah
Supreme Court, "A dependent is one who looks to another for
support, and the true criterion is whether one has a reasonable
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expectation of continuing or future support - to receive such
contributions as are necessary and needed to maintain him in
his accustomed station in life.H Farnsworth at 899/ quoting
Park Utah Consolidated Mines Co, v. Industrial Commission, 84
Utah 481, 488, 36 P.2d 979 (1934).
Dependency is determined by examining the facts.
Normally, this is the province of the Industrial Commission as
reiterated in Farnsworth at 899 quoting Rigby v. Industrial
Commission, 75 Utah 454, 458, 286 P. 628 (1930).
Whether one person is dependent upon
another within the meaning of the
Workmen's Compensation Act is primarily a
question of fact. It is the exclusive
province of the Industrial Commission to
determine the facts and to draw legitimate
inferences therefrom. It is also, in the
first instance, the province of the
Commission to determine from such facts
and inferences whether dependency does or
does not exist. When, however, the
established facts and inferences
reasonably deductible therefrom can lead
to but one conclusion, a question of law
is presented which this court, upon proper
application, must review.
The "established facts and inferences reasonably
deductible" in this case lead to one conclusion. On the date
of death, plaintiff was living apart from the deceased.
However, she was depending upon him to make the full mortgage
payment on their family home and to meet their significant
joint debt payments. Plaintiff was able to maintain her
standard of living only with the help of the decedent. It
appears that the Administrative Law Judge applied a too narrow
interpretation of dependency and focused only on whether day to
day support was being provided. This was error. It is
necessary to examine all aspects of dependency. When this is
done, one conclusion is reached, that Mrs. Dahl was dependent
upon decedent on the date of his death.
Although we do
following Mr. Dahl's
plaintiff is a clear
deceased was bearing
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The Industrial Commission's denial is reversed and this
case is remanded for administrative action in accordance with
the above.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

Norman H. Jackson, Judge
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Timothy M. Shea
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals

ORME, Judge:

Defendant was convicted of child abuse, a second degree
felony, and sentenced to a term of not less than one nor more
than fifteen years at the Utah State Penitentiary. On appeal,
she seeks reversal or modification of her conviction on the
theory that "physical injury" as defined in Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-109(1)(b) (1986) means a single act of abuse and cannot
mean several such acts. Her theory ignores the definitional
scheme in the child abuse statute and its acceptance would
thwart the purpose of the act. Accordingly, we affirm.
THE STATUTORY SCHEME
Defendant's primary contention on appeal is that if the
child abuse statute were properly construed, her conviction
should be reversed or at least reduced to a misdemeanor.!
Since the issue is one of statutory construction and the
statute is of recent origin, we quote the statute in its
entirety:
(1) As used in this section:
(a)

"Child" means a human being who is 17 years of
age or less;

1. Defendant also contends there was prejudicial error in
permitting the state's expert to testify concerning the
cumulative effects of the repeated acts of abuse suffered by
Defendant's child. As will become clear, the propriety of that
testimony turns entirely on the construction given the statute.

(b) HPhysical injuryN means impairment of the
physical condition including, but not limited to,
any contusion of the skin, laceratioV, failure to
thrive, malnutrition, burn, fracture of any bone,
subdural hematoma, injury to any internal organ, any
injury causing bleeding, or any physical condition
which imperils a child's health or welfare;
(c) "Serious physical injury" means any physical
injury which creates a permanent disfigurement;
protracted loss or impairment of a function of a
body member, limb or organ, or substantial risk of
death.
(2)

Any person who inflicts upon a child serious
physical injury or, having the care and custody of
such child, causes or permits another to inflict
serious physical injury upon a child is guilty of an
offense as follows:
(a) If done intentionally or knowingly, the offense
is a felony of the second degree;
(b) If done recklessly, the offense is a felony of
the third degree;
(c) If done with criminal negligence, the offense is
a class A misdemeanor.

(3)

Any person who inflicts upon a child physical
injury or, having the care and custody of such
child, causes or permits another to inflict physical
injury upon a child is guilty of an offense as
follows:
(a) If done intentionally or knowingly, the offense
is a class A misdemeanor;
(b) If done recklessly, the offense is a class B
misdemeanor;
(c) If done with criminal negligence, the offense is
a class C misdemeanor.

(4)

Criminal actions under this section may be
prosecuted in the county or district where the
offense is alleged to have been committed, where the
existence of the offense is discovered, where the
victim resides, or where the defendant resides.

Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-109 (1986).
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The statute defines child abuse crimes of varying
severity based on six possible combinations of the extent of
injury sustained by the child and the degree of the
perpetrator's culpability. At one end of this scale is class C
misdemeanor status for the perpetrator who causes or permits
non-serious injury as a result of criminally negligent
conduct. At the other end of the scale is second degree felony
status for persons who intentionally or knowingly cause or
permit serious injury to a child. The act also provides
definitions of the terms "physical injury" and "serious
physical injury" and for liberal venue.
PERTINENT FACTS
The key facts in this case are undisputed. Defendant and
her 16-month old baby moved in with Defendant's boyfriend.
Approximately a month later, the baby sustained cardiac arrest,
which was reversed, but died shortly after from edema, or
critical swelling, of the brain. Only weeks prior to his
death, the baby sustained second degree burns on his buttocks
and down one leg. The burns were in a grid-like pattern
corresponding to the inside of a clothes dryer door. Defendant
was slow in getting her baby to the hospital. After the baby's
release from the hospital, Defendant failed to follow
instructions for treatment of the burns, permitting the baby's
diapers to remain saturated with urine. A police investigation
ensued and Defendant agreed to keep her baby away from her
boyfriend. Nevertheless, she and her baby moved back in with
the boyfriend. Shortly after the three were reunited, the baby
suffered cardiac arrest. Medical personnel who had treated the
burns reported numerous bruises of varying sizes and ages over
much of the baby's body. Medical personnel who re-established
the baby's heartbeat noticed puncture wounds, probably
inflicted with a fork, on the bottom of his feet.
Dr. William Martin Palmer, a physician and expert on
child abuse, testified at trial that no one of the identified
instances of abuse, taken alone, created "permanent
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of a function of a
body member, limb or organ[;] or substantial risk of death."
However, Dr. Palmer testified, over Defendant's objection, that
the combination of the abusive acts did pose a substantial risk
of death.
ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that section 1(c) of the child abuse
statute defines "serious physical injury" in terms of "any
physical injury which creates a ... substantial risk of
death." Defendant equates "any" with "one," and argues that
since no one of the occurrences created a substantial risk of
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death to the baby, she can not be guilty of causing or
permitting serious physical injury under Section 2 of the
statute.2 On that basis, her conviction should be reversed
or, at the least, reduced to a conviction under Section 3 for
abuse of a non-serious type. It is Defendant's contention that
her conviction could be sustained only if the burn, bv itself,
or neglect in the treatment of the burn, bv itself, or an
individual bruise, by itself, or an individual puncture wound,
bv itself, could be shown to have been life-threatening.
Defendant's theory might be plausible if in enacting the
child abuse act the Legislature had in mind the ordinary
meaning of the word -injury." "Injury" in common parlance
means "3H act that damages, harms, or hurts." Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 1164 (1986) (Emphasis add€*d).
However, the Legislature has provided in the child abuse act a
definition which is expansive and clear, and which precludes
the construction argued for by Defendant. Leaving aside the
several examples mentioned in subsection 1(b) of the statute,
"physical injury" is defined there simply as an "impairment of
the physical condition." "Serious physical injury," under
subsection 1(c), accordingly means "impairment of the physical
condition" which results in "a permanent disfigurement;
protracted loss or impairment of a function of a body member,
limb, or organ [;] or substantial risk of

2. Although not raised in the briefs, the State pointed out at
oral argument that since Dr. Palmer also testified that the
baby died from brain swelling and that the swelling most likely
resulted from a deliberate violent act, such as severe shaking,
the jury's verdict of conviction can be sustained even if
Defendant's argument as to the meaning of the statute is
accepted. In view of the decision we reach, it is not
necessary to consider this contention.
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death."3 Since Defendant's baby was subjected to a course of
abuse which constituted "impairment" of his condition, and
since that impairment entailed a "substantial risk of death" as
the state's expert testified,4 it follows that Defendant was
duly convicted of second degree felony child abuse since the
jury also concluded that Defendant intentionally or knowingly
abused her child and/or intentionally or knowingly permitted
her boyfriend to do so.5
While our affirmance in this case is based on a plain
reading of the act under which Defendant was convicted, other
factors support our conclusion. The Court's primary
responsibility in construing legislation is to give effect to
the intent of the Legislature. Christensen v. Industrial
Commission, 642 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982). In addition,
one of the fundamental rules of statutory
construction is that the statute should be
looked at as a whole and in light of the
general purpose it was intended to serve; and
should be so interpreted and applied as
3. At oral argument, Defendant argued that "physical injury"
and "serious physical injury" are, in effect, two totally
self-standing and independent concepts. According to
Defendant, "physical injury" means just what subsection 1(b)
says it does and includes the more expansive concept of
"impairment." By contrast, "serious physical injury" means
just what it says and it does not include the concept of
"impairment." We cannot agree. Even though the Legislature
did not specifically state that the term "physical injury" as
used in subsection 1(c) shall be defined in accordance with
subsection 1(b), it would be absurd to look to Webster's for
the definition of "physical injury" as used in subsection 1(c)
where a specific definition of that very term is provided in
the immediately preceding subsection of an integrated and
carefully drawn statute. This is particularly true where the
text introducing the definitions makes clear that the
definitions are to be used throughout the entire statutory
section.
4. Since we reject Defendant's interpretation of the statute,
we necessarily find no error in permitting the doctor to
testify that the overall impairment of the baby's physical
condition was, in his opinion, life-threatening.
5. Defendant's boyfriend, James Chad Anderson, pleaded guilty
to third degree felony child abuse and was sentenced to a
prison term of not to exceed five years. The trial court
recommended that the entire sentence be served.
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to accomplish that objective. In order to
give the statute the implementation which
will fulfill its purpose, reason and
intention sometimes prevail over technically
applied literalness.
Andrus v. Mired, 17 Utah 2d 106, 109, 404 P.2d 972, 974
(1965). To limit the definition of "serious physical injury"
to one individual "injury" in the literal sense would thwart
the major purpose of the act, which is to curb the increase in
child abuse by imposing stiffer penalties on child abusers.
See "Utah Legislative Survey," 1982 Utah L. Rev. 164. Even
absent the definitional provisions upon which we rely, we would
not assume that the Legislature intended to distinguish between
severe abuse caused by a single violent act and severe abuse
typified by a series of violent acts with a cumulatively
debilitating effect.
Finally, we note that Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1978)
provides that the criminal laws of this state shall not be
construed strictly, but rather "according to the fair import of
their terms to promote justice."
Proper interpretation of the child abuse statute
requires our conclusion that multiple injuries which
cumulatively result in impairment of a child's physical
condition will sustain a second degree felony conviction where
the impairment is of the requisite magnitude and the
perpetrator's conduct is knowing or intentional. Defendant's
conviction is accordingly affirmed.

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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